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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH
CAROLINA STATUTORY AND CASE LAW*
Civil Procedure
Appellate Procedure
Earlier cases have never actually considered the effect of a reversal by
the Supreme Court, at the trial level. In a prior decision the court had
set aside a Charlotte recorder's court judgment enjoining enforcement
of statutes prohibiting "brown-bagging" in Mecklenburg county.1 The
Superior Court attempted to postpone enforcement, stating that the re-
versed judgment remained in force pending entry of a judgment in the
Superior Court in conformity with the Supreme Court's opinion.2 How-
ever, in D. & W., Inc. v. City of Charlotte,3 the Supreme Court declared
this action by the Superior Court a nullity. Thus, to the extent that the
certified opinion involves a declaration of a point of law, the mandate
of the Supreme Court is immediately efficacious.
Argument to the Jury: Reading Law
In his argument to the jury, defense counsel in Wilcox v. Clover
Motors, Inc.4 read excerpts from three Supreme Court opinionsu apply-
ing the doctrine of sudden emergency. Defendant had the verdict but
the Supreme Court reversed, stating:
* Editor's Note: This section will appear in the four regular issues of Volume
47 of the North Carolina Law Review. The coverage is limited to those statutes
and cases that, in the opinion of the Editorial Board with the advice of the
faculty, constitute significant developments in the various areas of the law. The
analysis is not extensive, but simply purports to bring these developments to the
attent;on of the practitioner. If a case has been noted or will be noted in the
Law Review, it will not be discussed in this section.
D. & W., Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 268 N.C. 577, 151 S.E.2d 241 (1966), dis-
cussed in Pollitt & Strong, Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Constitutional
Law. 45 N.C.L. REv. 855, 895 (1967).
2 It has been said that "vhile a certified decision is binding on the court of
original jurisdiction, the cause is not terminated until the authority of the superior
court has been exercised." Goodson v. Lehmon, 225 N.C. 514, 517-18, 35 S.E.2d
623. 625 (1945). See generally 2 A. MCINTOsH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1800 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as MCINTOSH]; McCall,
APIellate Practice and Procedure in North Carolina, 7 N.C.L. Rnv. 130, 146
(1929).
3268 N C. 720. 152 S.E.2d 199 (1966).
'269 N.C. 473, 153 S.E.2d 76 (1967).
'It is impermissible to read a dissenting opinion to the jury if the adverse
party objects. Conn v. Seaboard A.L. Ry., 201 N.C. 157, 159 S.E. 331 (1931).
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[C]ounsel may not properly argue: The facts in the reported case
where thus and so; in that case there was no negligence (or was
negligence) ; the facts in the present case are the same or stronger;
therefore the verdict in this case should be the same as the decision
there.0
By statute, 7 counsel in North Carolina may argue both facts and law
to the jury. And the Supreme Court has said that the decision whether
the trial judge will interfere upon objection to an improper remark or
argument, or wait and instruct the jury in his charge to disregard it,
is discretionary.' However, if the comment or argument is held to be a
gross abuse of the privilege of counsel and manifestly calculated to prej-
udice the jury,9 there is a duty resting upon the trial judge to interfere
at once when objection is made, stop counsel, and instruct the jury to
disregard the remarks.10 In Wilcox, the trial court's failure to correct
the impropriety by any of these methods was held reversible error.
Clerk of Superior Court
In North Carolina, primary jurisdiction in probate matters, as well
as in a number of "special proceedings," is vested in the clerk of
Superior Court, with provisions for transfer to the Superior Court for
trial of issues of fact.1 ' Though traditionally described as an "arm of
the Superior Court,"' 2 the clerk, in the exercise of probate jurisdiction,
has often been regarded as an inferior court.'" In re Estate of Lowther 4
illustrates one facet of this relationship.
Petitioner, representing herself to be the widow of the deceased, was
appointed administratrix of his estate, but upon motion the clerk re-
moved her, finding as fact that she had never actually been married to
the deceased. She excepted to the entry of the clerk's order and appealed
to the Superior Court. The judge vacated the clerk's order and directed
determination of the issue of fact by a jury. The Supreme Court re-
- 269 N.C. 473, 479, 153 S.E.2d 76, 81 (1967).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-14 (1965).
' State v. Bowen, 230 N.C. 710, 55 S.E.2d 466 (1949); State v. Brackett,
218 N.C. 369, 11 S.E.2d 146 (1940).
o State v. Tyson, 133 N.C. 528, 45 S.E.2d 838 (1903).1 Id.; State v. Dockery, 238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E.2d 664 (1953) ; State v. Tucker,
190 N.C. 708, 130 S.E. 720 (1925).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-174, 1-273 (1953). See In re Estate of Wallace, 267
N.C. 204, 147 S.E.2d 922 (1966).
" Hunt v. Sneed, 64 N.C. 180 (1870).
" See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAMES];
R. POUND, APPELATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 185-97, 355-56, 367 (1941).
' 271 N,C. 3451 156 S,E,2d 693 (1967),
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versed and stated that her general exception carried to the judge the
single question of whether the clerk's finding that she had never been mar-
ried to Lowther sustained his order revoking her letters of administra-
tion, which obviously it did. Therefore the judge was powerless to vacate
the clerk's judgment and order jury trial on that issue. Had petitioner
specifically excepted to the clerk's findings, she would have been entitled
to have the judge, in his discretion, submit the issue to a jury.
Discovery: Admission of Adverse Examination in Related Case
The adverse examination of a party, if not otherwise barred, is ad-
missible without regard to the availability of the party-deponent as a
live witness. In the usual case, a party offers in evidence a deposition
he has taken of another party directly aligned against him. However,
the North Carolina statute'5 governing admissibility is unclear on two
points :6 (1) whether an examination may be introduced in any action
other than the one in which it is taken and (2) whether only those parties
adversely aligned to the party-deponent in the action in which the exami-
nation was taken may introduce it into evidence. Three recent cases
partially answer these questions.
In Watson v. Stallings,17 the Supreme Court affirmed the right of
a party to introduce his own pretrial examination in evidence. The trial
judge in Glenn v. Smith s allowed the defendant to introduce in evidence
an adverse examination taken in an earlier action arising out of the
same automobile accident. The Supreme Court ordered a new trial on
grounds that the plaintiff was not a party in the earlier action and had no
opportunity to cross examine the deponent. In Pearce v. Barham,0 the
plaintiff in a later related action argued that since the deponent was not a
party but a witness when the deposition was offered, and since the defen-
dant in the later action had failed to satisfactorily account for the depo-
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.24(a) (1953) provides:
Upon the trial of the action or at any hearing incident thereto, any party
may offer in evidence the whole, but, if objection is made, not a part only,
of any deposition taken pursuant to this article, but such deposition shall
not be used against a party not notified of the taking thereof as provided
by G.S. § 1-568.14.
'
8 MCINTOSH § 2285 n.23.36 (Supp. 1964).
17270 N.C. 187, 154 S.E.2d 308 (1967).
18264 N.C. 706, 142 S.E.2d 596 (1965), discussed in Baer, Survey of North
Carolina Case Law: Trial Practice, 44 N.C.L. REV. 1054, 1057-58 (1966).
'* 271 N.C. 285, 156 S.E.2d 290 (1967). This case is discussed in the Recent
Developments: Torts, p. 276 infra. An earlier version of the same action, 267
N.C. 707, 149 S.E.2d 22 (1966), is discussed in Brandis, Survey of North Caro-
lina Case Law: Evidence, 45 N.C.L. REV. 934, 937 n.12 (1967).
[Vol. 47
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nent's absence, the deposition was inadmissible. The Supreme Court re-
jected this reasoning and stated that the status of the deposition follows
that of the deponent at the time of its taking, and at trial the deposition
may be offered by any party subject only to the notice requirements of
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.14.
These seem to be the holding of the cases:
(1) That a party may introduce his own adverse examination in ev-
idence in the action in which it was taken, in lieu of testifying
himself;
(2) That an examination properly taken may be introduced in ev-
idence in a second related action, though the deponent is not a
party to the second action, provided all parties to the second action
had both notice and an opportunity to cross examine at the time
of the taking of the deposition;
(3) That for purposes of determining whether the deposition is that
of a party or a witness, the status of the deponent at the time of
its taking is determinative.
Discovery: Disclosure of Medical Report
At present, the judge in child custody hearings has authority to
make the hearings as broad or as narrow as he, in his discretion, deems
necessary. In Gustafson v. Gustafson,2" custody of a child was awarded
after a hearing at which ex parte affidavits were submitted to establish
the mental stability of the successful spouse. The husband's request to
cross examine the affiants and to examine the treating physicians was
refused, and the Supreme Court found that not only had the judge not
abused his discretion, he was not authorized under the proviso of the
physician-patient privilege statute' to compel the disclosures sought,
since he was not a "presiding judge of the Superior Court in term."22
A statutory amendment will be necessary to extend the proviso power
to a judge presiding at custody hearings, thus avoiding the inconsistency
of having, in effect, two physician-patient privilege statutes-one abso-
lute, one qualified.
o 272 N.C. 452, 158 S.E.2d 619 (1967), noted in 46 N.C.L. REv. 956 (1968).
2' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953) provides:
No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be required
to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending a
patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary
to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a surgeon: Provided, that
the presiding judge of a Superior Court may compel such disclosure if in
his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice.22See Lockvood v. McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754, 136 S.E.2d 67 (1964).
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Discovery: Scope
Prior to Craddock v. Queen City Coach Co.,23 discovery of the iden-
tity of an adverse party's possible witnesses appeared proscribed by the
statutory statement of purpose, which limited discovery to "obtaining
evidence to be used at the trial." Earlier decisions seemed to require
that such discovery relate to the direct procurement of evidence itself,
rather than the mere means of obtaining it. But in Craddock the Su-
preme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the names and ad-
dresses of all the passengers on the defendant's bus at the time of the
accident.
Furr v. Simpson raised the question of whether a claim of privilege
can foreclose discovery of a prospective witness, for generally the rules
of privilege apply as fully to discovery as to trial. 5 The plaintiff, upon
pretrial examination, declined to disclose the name of the doctor who
had first treated the condition she contended was aggravated by the
accident in suit.26 The Supreme Court remanded the case with orders
that the plaintiff supply this name, but pointed out that the physician-
patient privilege2 7 might still be applicable to any information obtained
from hims.2  The decision seems reasonable. Certainly inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding allegedly privileged matter may be more freely
undertaken at a pretrial stage than in the midst of litigation, when such
an inquiry may distract the jury from the central issues in the case. On
the other hand, as it appeared from the pleadings that the introduction
of the privileged matter would be essential to the plaintiff's case, it
might have been preferable to deal with the question of privilege forth-
with.29
-- 264 N.C. 380, 141 S.E.2d 798 (1965), discussed in Baer, Survey of North
Carolina Case Law: Triat Practice, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1054, 1056-57 (1966); Bran-
dis, Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Evidence, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1005, 1019-20
(1966).
2'271 N.C. 221, 155 S.E.2d 746 (1967).
" United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Developments in the Law-
Discovery, 74 HAIv. L. REv. 940, 1009 (1961).
2 The physician was her former husband. Cf. Note, Evidence-Privileged
Communications Between Husband and Wife, 46 N.C.L. REv. 643, 645-47 (1968).
2Cf. Waldron Buick Co. v. General Mtrs. Corp., 251 N.C. 201, 110 S.E.2d
870 (1959) (holding that the defendant may not take the deposition of plaintiff's
physician).
28271 N.C. at 223, 155 S.E.2d at 747.
29 See generally JAMES § 6.8.
[Vol. 47
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Issues for Submission to Jury: Contributory Negligence
In Jackson v. McBride,3" the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that
he was struck by the defendant's car as he was standing on the shoulder
of the road. In his answer, however, the defendant stated that the plain-
tiff was lying motionless at night on the hard surface of the road. The
jury found for the plaintiff. Though reversing on other grounds, the
Supreme Court approved the trial judge's refusal to submit an issue of
contributory negligence to the jury. The court reasoned that since the
answer did not allege any negligence concurrent with the negligence of
the defendant as alleged in the complaint, there was, technically speaking,
no contributory negligence presented. The decision makes clear that when
parties plead directly contrary contentions, it is not sufficient to allege
"contributory negligence." To assert this defense, the pleading must be
structured to conditionally accept the plaintiff's allegations, and then allege
his concurring negligence within that hypothetical situation.3
Jurisdiction and Venue
In Carolina Plywood Distributors, Inc. v. McAndrews,32 a practice
that has probably been widely followed in effecting service of process
under the Non-Resident Motorists statute was held invalid.3 The defect
related to the form of the summons used. It commanded the sheriff to
summon the "Commissioner of Motor Vehicles." This is fatal form.
The correct form commands the sheriff to summon the defendant by
name.
Fleek v. Fleek"4 was a divorce action by a North Carolina resident
against her husband, a resident of either Switzerland or Italy. Follow-
ing a judgment of absolute divorce, the plaintiff moved for an order
that the defendant be required to pay child support. Notice was published
in the local newspaper and copies mailed to the defendant's last known
address. Through counsel the defendant entered a special appearance
and moved that the court deny the motion on the ground that service
'- 270 N.C. 367, 154 S.E.2d 468 (1967); accord, Dennis v. Voncannon, 272
N.C. 446, 158 S.E.2d 489 (1968).
"See generally JAmEs § 3.6.
270 N.C. 91, 153 S.E.2d 770 (1967); accord, In re Harris, 273 N.C. 20,
159 S.E.2d 539 (1968).
" See Brief for Appellee at 3, Sink v. Schafer, 266 N.C. 347, 145 S.E.2d 860
(1966); Brief for Appellee at 26, Pressley v. Turner, 249 N.C. 102, 105 S.E.2d
289 (1958).
"270 N.C. 736, 155 S.E.2d 290 (1967). See generally Baer, The Law of
Divorce Fifteen Years after Williams v. North Carolina, 36 N.C.L. REV. 265,
277 (1958).
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by publication would not support an in personam judgment. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion, and on appeal the Supreme Court
affirmed, following the general rule that it is possible for a valid divorce
decree to be entered by a court that has no jurisdiction to deal with the
other incidents of marriage, such as child support. While this is the
accepted rule, it has been criticized as anomalous ;8" for if the state has
sufficient interest in the marriage status to dissolve it in the absence of a
spouse who has been constructively served, the interest should warrant
the court in dealing with the other incidents of that status on the same
basis."0
The problem of determining whether an action is one concerning the
title to land, and hence local for venue purposes, continues to arise in
new contexts. 37 It is generally held that an action for breach of covenants
in a deed is an action for breach of contract and thus transitory. Al-
though it has long been held that an action for specific performance of a
contract to convey land is local,"8 the Supreme Court recently held in
Rose's Stores, Inc. v. Tarrytown Center, Inc.3 9 that an action to compel
compliance with a restrictive covenant on land use was not local, but
transitory.
Rose's involved an action to enjoin a shopping center from encroach-
ing upon parking and driveway rights guaranteed in the lease of the
plaintiff's store. The Supreme Court held that the action was transitory,
because "[t] he only result, should plaintiff prevail, would be the personal
enforcement of rights granted under a contract of lease."'40  Perhaps
the decision ignores some of the policy considerations underlying venue
in general, such as the enforceability of decrees and trial convenience. 41
As the subsequent contempt proceedings may indicate, there are diffi-
" See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 419 (1957) (dissenting
opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 353, 135
N.E.2d 553, 559, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1, 10 (1956) (dissenting opinion of Fuld, J.).
" J. EERENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1962).
"7See generally Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49
Mica. L. REv. 307 (1951).
"Vaughan v. Fallin, 183 N.C. 318, 111 S.E. 513 (1922) ; cf. Brady v. Brady,
161 N.C. 325, 326, 77 S.E. 235, 236 (1913). See generally MCINTOSH § 779.
For purposes of interstate venue, it is generally held that any court that gets
jurisdiction over a defendant's person has jurisdiction to enter a judgment com-
manding specific performance. J. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWs, 210-11
(1962).1-270 N.C. 201, 154 S.E.2d 320 (1967).
I- Id. at 206, 154 S.E.2d at 324.
"'Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. Rzv. 1, 12, 23 (1949).
[Vol. 47
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culties inherent in closely supervising actions relating to land lying in
another county.4 2
Thompson v. Horrel43 applied the general rule that a motion for
change of venue for the convenience of witnesses" is made only after
issue is joined on the pleadings.45 However, the reasons behind this rule
seemed absent. The action was brought in Wake County for breach of
a contract to build a house in Carteret County. Prior to answering, the
defendant filed an affidavit stating that he had instituted an action in
Carteret County to foreclose his laborer's lien on the same house.46
Consequently, he desired removal to Carteret County so that the actions
could be tried together. Having before him sufficient information upon
which to base a decision, the trial judge granted the motion. But the
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the trial court had acted prema-
turely by not waiting until the formal requirements for action had been
met.
Real Party in Interest
In Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Sheek,47 a partial-
ly subrogated insurer sued in its own name without making the insured
a party to the action. When the defendant moved to dismiss the action
on the ground that the insurer was not the real party in interest, any
possible claim by the insured himself had been barred by the statute of
limitations. The trial judge granted the defendant's motion and refused to
allow an amendment to correct the mistake in ascertaining the real party
in interest. He stated that it would amount to a substitution of parties
and would introduce a new cause of action.
The Supreme Court affirmed, relying upon Shambley v. Jobe-Black-
ley Plumbing & Heating Co.,4 s where an insured brought an action
against the wrongdoer for damages that had been paid in full by his
insurer. The court had refused to allow the insurer to be made an addi-
tional party, for the reason that this would change the cause of action.
42 Rose's Stores, Inc. v. Tarrytown Center, Inc., 270 N.C. 206, 154 S.E.2d
313 (1967).
," 272 N.C. 503, 158 S.E.2d 663 (1968).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-83(2) (1953) authorizes a change in venue to another
county, not as a matter of right, but "[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and
the ends of justice would be promoted by the change."
"I But see McINTosH § 834.
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-76(3) (1953) denominates such actions local. See
Mitchell v. Jones, 272 N.C. 449, 158 S.E.2d 706 (1968).
""272 N.C. 484, 158 S.E.2d 635 (1968).
"264 N.C. 456, 142 S.E.2d 18 (1965).
1968]
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Shambley has been criticized as representing "an unfortunate technical
judicial policy not required by-and, indeed, virtually in defiance of-the
controlling statutes." 49
Both Sheek and Shambley illustrate that too often rules persist despite
the lack of underlying justification. Familiar learning teaches that the rule
against splitting a cause of action underlies the requirement that title to
the entire claim remains in the insured when payment by the insurer does
not cover the entire loss.5" Similarly, amendment and relation back chiefly
present the undesirable possibilities of prejudice and of undermining the
statute of limitations. However, amendment should be aimed at facili-
tating the disposition of cases on their merits. In this context, these
two decisions are difficult to commend.
In Shambley, the fact that the insurer was fully subrogated to the
claim precluded any potential splitting of the claim, and it is unlikely such
amendment permitting the insurer to adopt the complaint would have
surprised the defendant. And in Sheek, though initially the cause of
action was potentially split, the running of the statute of limitations
precluded any such possibility. The reasonable view would appear to be
that the insurer, who was the "only party having an enforceable claim"' 1
against which the tortfeasor could be forced to defend, is the real party
in interest. Such a position would avoid the harsh result of leaving the
insurer remediless in statute-of-limitations cases.
" Brandis, Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Civil Procedure, 44 N.C.L.
REv. 897, 902 (1966). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-73 (1953) provides:
[W]hen a complete determination of the controversy cannot be made with-
out the presence of other parties, the court must cause them to be brought
in.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-163 (1953) provides:
The judge or court may . . . amend any pleading, process or proceeding,
by adding or striking out the name of any party....
The prohibition in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-163 (1953) of an amendment substantially
changing a claim or defense is confined to amendments conforming to the proof.
" Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E.2d 231 (1952); Powell &
Powell, Inc. v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916). See generally
C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 24 (2d ed. 1947).
Two considerations may account for the reluctance of the insured party to sue
in these situations. First, he may be subjected to counterclaim liability not
covered by the insurance policy. Second, the most the insured can realize from
a recovery against the tortfeasor would be the deductible amount not covered
by the insurance less usually one-third, which the insurer keeps for the expense
of prosecuting the action.
"' Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 225 N.C. 588, 591, 35
S.E.2d 879, 881 (1945), discussed in Note, Real Party in Interest-Partially
Subrogated Insurer's Standing to Sue, 38 N.C.L. REv. 99, 101 (1959). See also
3 J. MooRE, FERAL PRACTICE 17.02, at 1305 (2d ed. 1963).
[Vol. 47
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Reference
The rule is well established that reference should not ordinarily be
ordered when a "plea in bar"5 properly interposed in the action would, if
decided for the defendant, conclude the case.53 The reason for this rule
is clear: why go to the time and expense of reference before determining
whether a completely dispositive defense exists? Consequently, applica-
tion of the rule should not turn on technical inquiries as to whether a
particular defense is a "plea in bar" in the classical pleading sense, but
whether it can probably be disposed of by an inquiry extrinsic to that
necessary to resolve the main claim whose complexity is thought to
require consideration by a referee. In Shute v. Fisher,54 the Supreme
Court split over the problem. The suit was against the endorsers of a
promissory note. The defendants pleaded: (1) fraud in procuring their
endorsements, and (2) that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest.
A majority of the Supreme Court did not consider these defenses to
be the kind of "pleas in bar" whose interposition should prevent imme-
diate reference. A dissenting justice thought otherwise, looking more
clearly at the underlying rationale for the rule.
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
In Bowen v. Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co., 5 Bowen, the driver
of one of the trucks involved in the accident, obtained a default judgment
in Forsyth County against Shipp, the driver of the other truck involved.
Subsequently, in an action brought in Cabarrus County by Shipp's em-
ployer, A & B Trucking Company, against Bowen and his employer,
Hanes Knitting Company, the defendants got judgment on their counter-
claims. These judgments were less than the Forsyth judgment and were
satisfied by payment into Cabarrus County court by A & B's liability
insurer, Iowa Mutual. The Supreme Court held that the payment by
Iowa Mutual of the Cabarrus judgment extinguished Shipp's liability
under the Forsyth judgment, particularly since Bowen had rejected a
settlement of the default judgment and elected to pursue his action against
A & B by way of counterclaim in the second action. Thus, the decision
indicates that satisfaction of a judgment against the principal makes a
" See Murchison Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 191 N.C. 535, 132 S.E. 563 (1926)
(enumerating the principal pleas of this character).
" MCINTOSH § 1394, 1407.
r'270 N.C. 247, 154 S.E.2d 75 (1967).
" 270 N.C. 486, 155 S.E.2d 238 (1967).
19681
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prior judgment against the agent stemming from the same occurrence
unenforceable.
Current usage gives "res judicata" a broad meaning that covers all
the various ways in which a judgment in one action will have a binding
effect in another. This includes the effect of a former judgment as a
bar to a later action proceeding on all or part of the claim that was the
subject matter of the former. It also includes what is known as collateral
estoppel: the effect of a former judgment in a later action based upon
a different claim.56 Two Supreme Court decisions in this area point out
the elusive nature of these concepts.
The driver of one car, Kayler, sued Gallimore, the driver of the
other car involved in the accident. It was stipulated that at the time of
the collision Kayler was the agent of Stewart, the owner. In Stewart v.
Gallimore,57 the issues of Gallimore's negligence and Kayler's contrib-
utory negligence had been adjudicated adversely to Gallimore. Thus, in
Kayler v. Gallimore,58 Kayler argued that the only issue for the jury
was that of damages. The Supreme Court disagreed:
Clearly, had Gallimore prevailed in the suit brought against him by
Stewart, such judgment would not estop Kayler, who was not a
party to that case. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Stewart,
in the former action does not estop Gallimore from relitigating the
issues of negligence and contributory negligence when sued by
Kayler.59
This position is in accord with the Restatement 0 and follows the general
rule that there must be mutuality of estoppel, so that if both parties
would not be bound by a judgment, neither would be."'
A similar question was presented in Sumner v. Marion." Mrs.
Sumner, driving her husband's car, was struck in the rear by an auto
driven by Mrs. Marion. Mr. Sumner sued for damage to his car, and Mrs.
Marion counterclaimed. The counterclaim failed. Subsequently, Mrs.
Sumner instituted the present action for personal injuries, and Mrs.
Marion again pressed her counterclaim. The trial court dismissed the
J AMES § 11.9.
1265 N.C. 696, 144 S.E.2d 862 (1965). Kayler was initially joined as a co-
defendant in the action, but subsequently the claim against him was nonsuited.
'269 N.C. 405, 152 S.E.2d 518 (1967).
" Id. at 408, 152 S.E.2d at 522.
"0 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). See generally McINToSH § 1734
(Supp. 1964).
"
1 JAMES § 11.31. See also Developnents in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HAIv.
L. REv. 818, 856-57 (1952).62272 N.C. 92, 157 S.E.2d 667 (1967).
[VCol. 47
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counterclaim on grounds that it was barred by the former judgment.
Relying directly upon Kayler, the Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam
opinion.
However, it is questionable whether Kayler is proper authority for
the holding in Sumner. Kayler involved an attempt by an agent to use
affirmatively the priqr judgment in favor of his principal. 3 The decision
there reflects the general rule that collateral estoppel may be used as a
shield, but not as a sword. 4 However, in Sumner, the plaintiff attempted
to invoke collateral estoppel defensively; the Supreme Court's denial of
that shield rested upon authority that is not in point.
In defense of the court, it may be said that Sumner did not present
the usual case of collateral estoppel being used as a shield.65 Assume
that Mrs. Sumner sued first and defeated the counterclaim. In a subse-
quent suit by Mr. Sumner, the principal, the prior judgment on the
counterclaim could be invoked, to avoid the anomalous result of the
principal losing to the counterclaim, then exercising his right of indemnifi-
cation against the agent-in effect holding the agent liable on a claim
from which he had been earlier exonerated. Technically, this basic justifi-
cation for allowing the principal to use the prior judgment as a shield
was absent in Sumner. And if this potentially anomalous result, that is
holding the agent indirectly liable, is the basis for abandoning the rule
of mutuality, then the decision in Sumner is probably correct, though
wrong for relying upon Kayler.
Nevertheless, a more basic policy underlying collateral estoppel is the
desirability of avoiding blatantly inconsistent results on the same facts.
And, in Sumner, should Mrs. Marion succeed on her resurrected counter-
claim, as a practical effect, Mr. Sumner would eventually pay it, though
in the prior action he avoided liability for it.
Saving Statute
In North Carolina, the plaintiff may take a voluntary nonsuit at any
time before rendition of the verdict66 and then reinstitute the same suit
" See McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., 212 Cal. App. 2d 422, 28
Cal. Rptr. 37 (1963); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111(1958).
o Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) ; accord,
Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968); Cf. JAMES § 10.14 at 474 n.21.
", See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96 and Comment b (1942).
s" This is the common law rule. See Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228
U.S. 364, 392-95 (1913); MCINToSH § 1488(4); Louis, The Suflfciency of the
Complaint, Res Judicata and the Statute of Limitations-A Study Occasioned
by Recent Changes in the North Carolina Code, 45 N.C.L. REv. 659-60, 677-78
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without prejudice within one year.0 7 In High v. Broadnax,08 more than
two years after the decedent's death, but less than one year after non-
suit in Virginia federal court," the administratrix reinstituted her suit
for wrongful death in the North Carolina Superior Court. The Supreme
Court held that the action was barred by the two year statute of limita-
tions applicable to wrongful death actions, since the saving statute does
not apply when the original suit is brought in another state.
Torts
Contribution
On January 1, 1968, the Uniform Contribution among Tort-Feasors
Act became effective in North Carolina.' This statute is more compre-
hensive than the previous provision,2 and should dispel the confusion
that has permeated the North Carolina law of contribution. It would
be futile to detail all the problems under the old statute; however, a
brief examination of the Uniform Act's treatment of several of them
will point out the worth of the new statute.
The most serious problem was presented where the plaintiff initially
collected against the insurer of one tortfeasor. By this act the paying
insurer was effectively barred from any right of contribution: if the
insurer tried to sue the other tortfeasor or the latter's insurer, the suit
was barred because the insurer was not a joint tortfeasor ;4 if the insured
brought the suit, the court held that the insurer was the real party in
interest.3 Although later cases provided some relief," the Uniform Act's
(1967); Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 838(1952). But cf. Walker v. Story, 256 N.C. 453, 124 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-25 (1953). See Briley v. Roberson, 214 N.C. 295,
199 S.E. 73 (1938).
-8271 N.C. 313, 156 S.E.2d 282 (1967).
8" Taking a voluntary nonsuit in federal court is within the discretion of the
district judge, unless taken before answer or by stipulation of all the parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1 to -6 (Supp. 1967).2N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 1-240 (1953).
8See generally Thorpe, Torts: Part Two, Survey of North Carolina Case
Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1047, 1051 (1966); Note, Joint Tort-Feasors-Validity of
Covenant Not to Sue, 30 N.C.L. REV. 75 (1951); Note, Torts-Insurers-Contri-
bution, 15 N.C.L. REv. 289 (1937).
'See, e.g., Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960).
'See, e.g., Herring v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961).8 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bynum, 267 N.C. 289, 148 S.E.2d
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refreshingly simple approach allows the insurer to succeed to its insured's
right of contribution. 7
The Uniform Contribution among Tort-Feasors Act also abolishes
the distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue.' Previously,
a plaintiff desirous of settling with one joint tortfeasor had to give
the settling tortfeasor a covenant not to sue, rather than a release, to
retain his rights against the other tortfeasor(s) . The Uniform Act
provides that a release, a covenant not to sue, or a covenant not to enforce
judgment given to one tortfeasor, discharges all liable parties only if
its terms so provide.1" Further, the effect of the settlement on the liability
of the other parties is set forth:" their liability is reduced by the greater
of the amount stipulated in the agreement or the consideration paid for
it.' 2
Contributory Negligence
The Supreme Court has dealt significantly with the issue of contribu-
tory negligence in four cases. In Miller v. Miller,'" a case of first impres-
sion, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent in failing to fasten his seat belt. In a well documented opinion,
Justice Sharp concluded for the court that failure to fasten a seat belt was
not contributory negligence. Among the reasons for this decision were the
following: (1) the desirability of seat belts is still debatable; (2) only
through hindsight could it be determined that the seat belt would have pre-
vented rather than caused the injury; (3) the failure to "buckle up" in no
way contributed to the accident; (4) difficult proximate cause issues would
be presented; and (5) the imposition of such a rule should come from
the legislature. It was also held that plaintiff's failure to fasten his seat
belt did not reduce defendant's liability under the avoidable consequences
114 (1966); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 749,
142 S.E.2d 694 (1965); Pittman v. Snedeker, 264 N.C. 55, 140 S.E.2d 740 (1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1(d) (Supp. 1967).8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (Supp. 1967).
'See, e.g., Slade v. Sherrod, 175 N.C. 346, 95 S.E. 557 (1918) ; Torts, Eleventh
Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 42 N.C.L. REv. 721, 726 (1964).
But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540.1 (1953), commented on in Baer, Effects of
Release Given Tortfeasor Causing Initial Injury in Later Action for Malpractice
Against Treating Physician, 40 N.C.L. REV. 88 (1961).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (Supp. 1967).
" This problem has not been before the court. See Note, Joint Tort-Feasors-
Contribution-Effects of Statute on Covenant Not to Sute, 35 N.C.L. REv. 141(1956).
"
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (Supp. 1967).
8273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
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rule: the duty to minimize damages arises only after the defendant's
negligence. The court reasoned that there being no duty to use the seat
belt, a failure to do so could not be a breach of duty to mitigate damages.
In North Carolina a plaintiff's contributory negligence will not bar
his recovery where defendant's conduct is classified as willful or wanton.
1 4
But, presumably, where plaintiff's contributory fault is found willful or
wanton, the defendant has a valid defense. An application of this rule
is presented in Pearce v. Barham,5 where plaintiff sued for injuries
arising out of an automobile accident, was nonsuited, and appealed. The
evidence tended to show that defendant's intestate was operating his
vehicle on a wet road with slick tires at speeds up to ninety miles per
hour. The Supreme Court, finding some confusion in the trial court's
charge and the jury's response thereto, assumed that the jury found
the driver's conduct willful and wanton. Defendant charged plaintiff
with contributory negligence in that she failed to object to the manner
in which the car was being operated, and jerked, pulled, and slapped at
the driver in a "drunken rage." The lower court instructed the jury
that plaintiff's contributory fault in any one of these particulars would
bar her recovery. The court found error in that only plaintiff's inter-
ference with the driver could be characterized as willful or wanton, and
thus prevent an award of damages. It was further noted that defendant
failed to call plaintiff's conduct willful or wanton. Whether riding with
an intoxicated driver at speed of ninety miles an hour without objection
is mere ordinary negligence is debatable. At least, the decision should
be carefully limited, as the court certainly cannot mean to imply that
engaging the driver in a brawl is simple negligence.
At issue in Hoots v. Beeson' and Welch v. Jenkins'7 was the contrib-
utory negligence of a minor. In both cases a young cyclist was struck
by an automobile. In Hoots an eleven year old boy was killed; in Welch
a fourteen year old boy was injured. The jury found in both instances
that the contributory negligence of the minor barred any recovery. On
appeal both plaintiffs assigned as error instructions dealing with the
minor's contributory negligence.
The court has formulated three rules or presumptions in dealing with
a minor's negligence. Infants under seven years of age are conclusively
' Blevins v. France, 244 N.C. 334, 93 S.E.2d 549 (1956).
1271 N.C. 285, 156 S.E.2d 290 (1967). This case is discussed herein at
pp. 264-65 supra.
18272 N.C. 644, 159 S.E.2d 16 (1968).
1271 N.C. 138, 155 S.E.2d 763 (1967).
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presumed to be incapable of negligence. Those over fourteen years of
age are presumed to be capable of negligence, and unless the presumption
is rebutted, the adult standard of care applies. Those infants between
seven and fourteen are presumed incapable of negligence; if the pre-
sumption is rebutted the standard by which his conduct is to be gauged
is that of a child of like age and experience.
The trial court in Hoots gave an instruction which had been pre-
viously approved by the Supreme Court in Leach v. Varley.'8 This in-
struction failed, however, to adequately state the presumption as to the
negligence of a child between the ages of seven and fourteen, and also
tended to equate the standard of care required to that required of an
adult. The court, overruling Leach, found reversible error in both these
points. The trial court must now carefully instruct the jury as to the
significance of the presumption that a child between seven and fourteen
is incapable of contributory negligence. Further, if the presumption is
rebutted, the standard by which the child's conduct is to be measured is
not that of an adult, but that of a child of like age, experience, and intelli-
gence.
The plaintiff's contention in Welch was that he, as a fourteen year
old, should not be held to the same standard of care as an adult.
The court held that some definite age must be set at which a minor is
presumed to possess the capacity of an adult to care for himself; other-
wise the jury would have no standard to guide it. Thus, a fourteen
year old, nothing to the contrary appearing, is held to the adult standard
of care.
Last Clear Chance
The confusion surrounding the last clear chance doctrine was cleared
to some extent by two decisions. In Presnell v. Payne,19 plaintiff's inte-
state sat on the fender of a truck that was being used to push a station
wagon in order to "jump start" it. When the automobile started and
began to pull away, defendant applied the brakes of the truck causing
the decedent to fall beneath the wheels of the still-moving vehicle. To
defendant's answer alleging contributory negligence, plaintiff replied that
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the fatal accident. Although
the lower court was held correct in refusing to submit the issue of last
clear chance to the jury, the court departed from the rule that last clear
"8211 N.C. 207, 189 S.E. 636 (1937).
20 272 NC. 11, 157 S,E,2d 601 (1967).
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chance cannot apply when the plaintiff is found by the court to be con-
tributorily negligent 0 as a matter of law. The court frankly admitted
that efforts to explain the rule had proved futile, and simply stated:
[T]he better reasoned view is that an issue of last clear chance may
arise whether contributory negligence is determined by the Court as
a matter of law, or found by the jury as an issue of fact.21
Prior to Exum v. Boyles,22 the North Carolina court had held that
the original negligent act of the defendant could not be relied upon to in-
voke the last clear chance doctrine.' Viewing the issue as one of proxi-
mate cause, the court felt that plaintiff's contributory negligence super-
seded defendant's negligence. Thus, for the doctrine to apply, the court
required some further negligence on the part of the defendant to intervene
between plaintiff's negligence and the injury. In Exurn plaintiff's de-
cedent was changing a tire along the side of a highway when he was
struck by an automobile driven by the defendant. Both parties were
negligent: defendant in failing to keep a proper lookout and in failing
to move toward the center of the road; the decedent in failing to pull
his car further onto the shoulder of the road and in working in such
close proximity to the road. The plaintiff contended that the defendant
had the last clear chance. The lower court refused to submit the issue
to the jury. Finding that the jury should have determined whether
defendant could have avoided the accident had he maintained a proper
lookout, the court awarded the plaintiff a new trial. Obviously, no new
and independent act of negligence on the part of the defendant inter-
vened. The Supreme Court recognized this and admitted that the original
negligence "of the defendant is sufficient to bring the doctrine of the
last clear chance into play if the other elements of that doctrine are
proved." ' While it does not appear that the previous rule caused errone-
ous decisions, its demise is desirable "since it adds nothing but confusion
to an already confusing subject." 5
2 See, e.g., Arvin v. McClintock, 253 N.C. 679, 118 S.E.2d 129 (1961). See
also Torts, Eleventh Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 42 N.C.L.
REv. 721, 723 (1964).21 Presnell v. Payne, 272 N.C. 11, 14-15, 157 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1967).
2272 N.C. 567, 158 S.E.2d 845 (1968).
"' See, e.g., Mathis v. Marlow, 261 N.C. 636, 135 S.E.2d 633 (1964).
2' Exum v. Boyles, 272 N.C. 567, 576-77, 158 S.E.2d 845, 853 (1968).
25 Torts, Eleventh Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 42 N.C.L.
REv. 721, 725 (1964).
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Miscellaneous
Perhaps one of the most important decisions is Corprew v. Geigy
Chemical Corp.2" There the court limited the requirement of privity in
warranty actions. The case has been noted elsewhere 7 and will not be
discussed herein.
Also discussed in a previous casenote28 is Phelps v. Winston-Salem, 9
where the court continues its strict and erroneous position on proof of
causation in negligence actions.
Malpractice-Duty to Inform
Traditionally the North Carolina court has demonstrated a relatively
stringent view of malpractice suits.30 Koury v. Fallo3 l may signal a
retreat from this attitude. There the plaintiff brought his nine month
old daughter to the defendant for treatment of asthmatic bronchitis.
The defendant prescribed a drug that caused the infant's deafness. The
container in which the drug was packaged warned, "Not for Pediatric
Use," and a pamphlet inside the container explained the risk in admin-
istering the drug to children. The defendant claimed that he was un-
aware of these warnings, although he knew that the drug could impair
the aural nerves. On plaintiff's appeal from a nonsuit, the court held that
the evidence could support a finding that the defendant had breached
his duty to inform the parents in order that they might make an intelli-
gent choice. In the words of the court:
The plaintiff's evidence shows that the defendant did not so inform
the parents of this little girl and thus give them the opportunity of
an informed election between incurring the risk of prolonged bron-
chitis and possible pneumonia on the one hand and incurring the
risk of total and permanent deafness of their child on the other.3 2
The court noted the absence of an emergency and the fact that no
therapeutic reasons existed to justify the nondisclosure, since it was the
parents', not the patient's, consent which was to be obtained.33
271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
Note, Products Liability-Is Privity Dead?, 46 N.C.L. REv. 1010 (1968).
Note, Causal Relationship, 46 N.C.L. REv. 1001 (1968).
20272 N.C. 24, 157 S.E.2d 719 (1967).
"See, e.g., Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956). See
Byrd & Dobbs, Torts, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 43 N.C.L. REv.
906, 912 (1965); Note, 34 N.C.L. REv. 581 (1956).
"272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
"Id. at 375, 158 S.E.2d at 555.
22 The court also found that the evidence justified the conclusion that the dose
prescribed br the defendant was excessive, This finding would not seem. to limit
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In Starnes v. Taylor, 4 plaintiff's esophagus was perforated during
the course of an esophagoscopy. Plaintiff contended that the defendant-
physician failed to warn him of any risks. The defendant claimed that
he advised plaintiff that any surgery involves some risk. Unlike Koury,
the court found that therapeutic reasons may have prevented the defen-
dant from warning plaintiff of specific risks and that it did not appear
that the plaintiff would have declined the operation even if warned of
such risks. A nonsuit was affirmed.
Prenatal Injuries and Mental Distress
In Stetson v. Easterling,35 a wrongful death action, the court held
that a child, who is born alive, may recover for injuries sustained while
en ventre sa mere. The court was forced to decide this question since
the wrongful death action is available only where the decedent, had he
lived, would have been entitled to an action for damages.30 Previously,
it had been held that the pecuniary loss rule, discussed infra, precluded
recovery for the wrongful death of a child en ventre sa mere.37 Stetson
was a case of first impression, and in deciding as it did, the court joined
the great majority of jurisdictions.8 8
It is the North Carolina (and probably the majority) rule that there
can be no recovery for mental distress caused by negligent conduct,
unless accompanied by a contemporaneous physical injury 9 Crews v.
Provident Finance Co. 49 presented to the court the opportunity to further
define "physical injury." There defendant's bill collector, knowing plain-
tiff to have a heart condition, allegedly threatened her in vulgar language.
As a result, the plaintiff suffered an attack of agina, became extremely
nervous, and required bed rest. The Supreme Court reversed the non-
suit entered by the trial court, holding that the physical injury need
not be visible and that plaintiff's injuries were sufficient to come within
the decision as to the duty to disclose, however, since the drug, even in proper
dosage, could impair the hearing of a child.1'272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968).
?1' 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968).
Goldsmith v. Samet, 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931).
Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966). The question of
whether a viable child en ventre sa mere, who is born dead, is a person within
the wrongful death act was not decided.
" W. PROSSER, LAW or TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964).
" Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965). See Note,
Damages-Mental Anguish-Action. Arising out of Contract, 28 N.C.L. REv. 318
(1950).
, 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967).
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the rule. The decision is not surprising, for as early as 1906 the court
held that the plaintiff could recover even though "the physical injury
consists of a wrecked nervous system instead of lacerated limbs.""
Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Greene v. Nichols,42 the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled
previous conflicting and confusing decisions by holding that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur may be applied to an unexplained single car accident.
Prior to Greene, the court had consistently stated that res ipsa was un-
available where a car inexplicably left the road.3 Plaintiffs in such a
case could avoid nonsuit only by offering evidence tending to negate the
possibility that a cause, other than the defendant's negligence, could be
found responsible for the accident.4 The court apparently feared that
application of res ipsa to such cases could work an injustice to the
defendant, who often had no better means to explain the accident than
did the plaintiff. By requiring that the probability of other causes be
discounted before allowing the case to go to the jury, the court was
attempting to strike a fairer balance. While this approach is not inde-
fensible, it led to decisions more inexplicable than the accidents which
prompted them.45
The evidence presented by the plaintiff in Greene consisted primarily
of a description of the respective conditions of the automobile, its pas-
sengers, and the tree with which it collided. The driver, ignoring a
warning roadsign, had failed to negotiate a curve on a winding country
road. The car struck a large tree killing both passengers instantly; the
driver died shortly thereafter. From the condition of both the car and
the tree it was obvious that the speed at impact had been great. Since the
evidence failed to adequately discount the possibility of other causes,4"
"' Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 404, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906).
"-274 N.C. 18, 161 S.E.2d 521 (1968).
" See, e.g., Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Snowden, 267 N.C. 749, 148 S.E.2d
833 (1966); King v. Bonardi, 267 N.C. 221, 148 S.E.2d 32 (1966).
"See, e.g., Lane v. Dorney, 250 N.C. 15, 108 S.E.2d 55 (1959), rev'd on
rehearing, 252 N.C. 90, 113 S.E.2d 33 (1960), noted in 39 N.C.L. REv. 198
(1961). The standard allegations by which other possible causes were discounted
were to the effect that the road was dry and in good condition; that there was
little or no traffic; that the driver did not suffer from fits or seizures and was
in good health; and that the car was in good mechanical condition.
" Compare Lane v. Dorney, id., with Ivey v. Rollins, 250 N.C. 89, 108 S.E.2d
63 (1959). See also Byrd, Torts: Part I, Survey of North Carolina Case Law,
44 N.C.L. Rnv. 1039 (1966); Byrd & Dobbs, Torts, Survey of North Carolina
Case Law, 43 N.C.L. Rnv. 906, 915 (1965).
"Plaintiff failed to offer evidence as to the condition of the car or as to
the health of the driver.
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the lower court entered a nonsuit. Although the decision was affirmed
for other reasons,41 the court seized this opportunity to declare that res
ipsa could be applied to this type of case and an inference of negligence
drawn therefrom. Prior decisions which had sustained nonsuits because
of the absence of the required proof were declared to be "inconsistent
with common experience." 4 Furthermore, "[t]he application of res ipsa
loquitur to this factual situation is the general rule."40
Wrongful Death-Pecuniary Loss Rule
Although easing the burden of proving the defendant's negligence,
the Greene decision continues the "pecuniary loss" rule, which has plagued
plaintiffs seeking to recover for the wrongful deaths of their decedents.Y°
The plaintiff's decedent in Greene was the fifteen year old wife of the
driver, defendant's intestate. The nonsuit entered by the lower court
was affirmed because the plaintiff "failed to show that his intestate had
any earning capacity or that her untimely death resulted in a net pecuni-
ary loss to her estate.""1 Chief Justice Parker, joined by Justice Higgins,
dissented. Their disagreement went not to the pecuniary loss rule itself,
but to its application to this case. The dissenters felt that the health and
earning capacity of a young woman should be presumed.
A second and more severe application of the pecuniary loss rule is
presented in Stetson v. Easterling.52 There recovery was denied for the
' See notes 50-52 infra and accompanying text.
48 Greene v. Nichols, 274 N.C. 18, 26, 161 S.E.2d 521, 526 (1968).
,9 Id. at 27, 161 S.E.2d at 527.
" The pecuniary loss rule has been stated as follows:
The measure of damages in actions for wrongful death is the present
worth of the net pecuniary value of the life of the deceased to be ascertained
by deducting the probable cost of his own living and usual or ordinary
expenses from his probable gross income which might be expected to be
derived from his own exertions during his life expectancy.... In arriving
at the net pecuniary value of the life of the deceased, the jury is at liberty
to take into consideration the age, health and expectancy of life of the
deceased, his earning capacity, his habits, his ability and skill, the business
-in which he was employed and the means he had for earning money, the
end of it all being ... to enable the jury fairly to arrive at the net income
which the deceased might reasonably be expected to earn from his own
exertions, had his death not ensued, and thus assess the pecuniary worth
of the deceased to his family, had his life not been cut short by the wrong-
ful act of the defendant.
Journigan v. Little River Ice Co., 233 N.C. 180, 184-85, 63 S.E.2d 183, 186(1951). See Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L.
REv. 402 (1966).
Greene v. Nichols, 274 N.C. 18, 28, 161 S.E.2d 521, 528 (1968).
8274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968). See discussion of case at p. 280
mtpra.
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death of a two month old infant, allegedly caused by the negligence of
defendant-physicians. It is, of course, apparent that the pecuniary loss
rule works most harshly where the decedent is extremely young or ex-
tremely old and therefore, in monetary terms, is a liability rather than
an asset.
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